This SpringerBrief deals with a class of discrete-time zero-sum Markov
games with Borel state and action spaces, and possibly unbounded
payoffs, under discounted and average criteria, whose state process
evolves according to a stochastic difference equation. The corresponding
disturbance process is an observable sequence of independent and
identically distributed random variables with unknown distribution for
both players. Unlike the standard case, the game is played over an
infinite horizon evolving as follows. At each stage, once the players
have observed the state of the game, and before choosing the actions,
players 1 and 2 implement a statistical estimation process to obtain
estimates of the unknown distribution. Then, independently, the players
adapt their decisions to such estimators to select their actions and
construct their strategies. This book presents a systematic analysis on
recent developments in this kind of games. Specifically, the theoretical
foundations on the procedures combining statistical estimation and
control techniques for the construction of strategies of the players are
introduced, with illustrative examples. In this sense, the book is an
essential reference for theoretical and applied researchers in the
fields of stochastic control and game theory, and their applications.