Across Africa in the post-1956 era, the aspirations of African
nationalists to secure power were boosted and quickly realized by the
British, French and Belgian hasty retreat from empire. The Portuguese,
Southern Rhodesian and South African governments, however, stood firm
and would be challenged by their African nationalists. Influenced by the
Communist bloc, these nationalists adopted the 'Armed Struggle'. In the
case of Rhodesia, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), led by
Joshua Nkomo, took this step in 1962 after their effort to foment
rebellion in Rhodesia's urban areas in 1961-62 had been frustrated by
police action and stiffened security legislation. Rhodesia's small,
undermanned security forces, however, remained wary as Zambia and
Tanganyika had given sanctuary to communist- supplied ZAPU and Zimbabwe
African National Union (ZANU) guerrillas.
The Rhodesians had foreseen that the northeastern frontier with
Mozambique would be the most vulnerable to incursions because the
African population living along it offered an immediate target for
succour and subversion. The Portuguese were not seen as a bulwark as
they were clearly making little progress in their counter-insurgency
effort against their FRELIMO nationalist opponents. The Rhodesians were
fortunate, however, that ZAPU and ZANU chose to probe across the Zambezi
River from Zambia into the harsh, sparsely populated bush of the Zambezi
Valley. The consequence was that the Rhodesian security forces conducted
a number of successful operations in the period 1966-1972 which dented
insurgent ambitions.
This book describes and examines the first phase of the 'bush war'
during which the Rhodesian forces honed their individual and joint
skills, emerging as a formidable albeit lean fighting force.
