For many, before 1914, a huge European war had seemed impossible.
Conflicts in the Balkans flared up yet stayed contained. The Belgian
historian Henri Pirenne wrote to a friend in December 1905: "Do you
really believe in the possibility of a war? For me it is impossible to
have the least fear in that regard." In March 1912, the British peer
Lord Esher - an authority on defence matters - told an audience of
Britain's senior Generals that war "becomes every day more difficult and
improbable". After all, what could be gained by war? In 1909, the
British writer Norman Angell claimed that with the increasing
interdependence of nations war could not benefit the victor. All
participating countries would be impoverished; the idea of victory was a
"great illusion". In this short guide Max Egremont looks at
controversies which have raged over the years. What caused the war? Who
should be blamed for its outbreak? Should Britain have joined in and,
after it did, were its soldiers really, as has been claimed, "lions led
by donkeys"? What was America's role? And was the final peace settlement
as fair and sensible as possible in the circumstances or, by humiliating
Germany, did the Allies pave the way to a Second World War, a truly
global conflict which turned out to be even bloodier and more
destructive than the First?