What is the nature of a conceptual scheme? Are there alternative
conceptual schemes? If so, are some more justifiable or correct than
others? The later Wittgenstein already addresses these fundamental
philosophical questions under the general rubric of "grammar" and the
question of its "arbitrariness"--and does so with great subtlety. This
book explores Wittgenstein's views on these questions.
Part I interprets his conception of grammar as a generalized (and
otherwise modified) version of Kant's transcendental idealist solution
to a puzzle about necessity. It also seeks to reconcile Wittgenstein's
seemingly inconsistent answers to the question of whether or not grammar
is arbitrary by showing that he believed grammar to be arbitrary in one
sense and non-arbitrary in another.
Part II focuses on an especially central and contested feature of
Wittgenstein's account: a thesis of the diversity of grammars. The
author discusses this thesis in connection with the nature of formal
logic, the limits of language, and the conditions of semantic
understanding or access.
Strongly argued and cleary written, this book will appeal not only to
philosophers but also to students of the human sciences, for whom
Wittgenstein's work holds great relevance.