This book develops an argument for a historicist and non-foundationalist
notion of rationality based on an interpretation of Wittgenstein of the
Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty. The book examines two
notions of rationality-a universal versus a constitutive conception -
and their significance for educational theory. The former advanced by
analytic philosophy of education as a form of conceptual analysis is
based on a mistaken reading of Wittgenstein. Analytic philosophy of
education used a reading of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language to set
up and justify an absolute, universal and ahistorical notion of
rationality. By contrast, the book examines the underlying influence of
the later Wittgenstein on the historicist turn in philosophy of science
as a basis for a non-foundationalist and constitutive notion of
rationality which is both historical and cultural, and remains
consistent with wider developments in philosophy, hermeneutics and
social theory. This book aims to understand the philosophical motivation
behind this view, to examine its intellectual underpinnings and to
substitute this universal conception of rationality by reference to a
Hegelian interpretation of the later Wittgenstein that emphasizes his
status as an anti-foundational thinker.