The rulers of both England and France had reason to be unhappy as the
1380s dawned. Although the French regime was in better shape than it had
been in a while, the country still lay open to English attack and the
populace was angry about it. The English regime was no happier; it was
futilely trying to realize the gains seemingly promised by the victory
at Poitiers back in 1356. This had been its constant occupation for a
quarter century, but ultimate success seemed as far away as ever. Will a
Frenchman Fight? describes a campaign of the Hundred Years War in 1380-1
in which a variety of different kinds of combat and different motives
for fighting are evident. The campaign itself was a great chevauchee, or
raid, by the English through France and though it had its practical
goals, it was also a striking illustration of the place of chivalric
self-image in shaping warfare. The English hoped to weaken their
opponents by demonstrating that the French king, Charles V, could not
defend his subjects. The French king had practical reasons for wishing
to avoid spectacular but dangerous set battles similar to Crecy and
Poitiers--battles that had been catastrophic for the French. Avoiding
battle, however, had its price. If enough people in France concluded
that the English were right in their scorn for royal power, that power
would be significantly reduced. In the fourth volume of the Deeds of
Arms series, Professor Muhlberger demonstrates that although Charles V's
strategy for avoiding battle was prudent, it was unpopular, showing how
considerations of war, peace and personal honor were tightly bound
together, and that direct confrontation of man against man or army
against army was the most satisfying way of settling such issues. Color
illustrations, maps, and a comprehensive bibliography complement this
fascinating text.
