Both volumes of this work have as their central concern to sort out
who one is from what one is. In this Book 1, the focus is on
transcendental-phenomenological ontology. When we refer to ourselves we
refer both non-ascriptively in regard to non-propertied as well as
ascriptively in regard to propertied aspects of ourselves. The latter is
the richness of our personal being; the former is the essentially
elusive central concern of this Book 1: I can be aware of myself and
refer to myself without it being necessary to think of any
third-personal characteristic; indeed one may be aware of oneself
without having to be aware of anything except oneself. This
consideration opens the door to basic issues in phenomenological
ontology, such as identity, individuation, and substance. In our
knowledge and love of Others we find symmetry with the first-person
self-knowledge, both in its non-ascriptive forms as well as in its
property-ascribing forms. Love properly has for its referent the Other
as present through but beyond her properties.
Transcendental-phenomenological reflections move us to consider
paradoxes of the "transcendental person". For example, we contend with
the unpresentability in the transcendental first-person of our beginning
or ending and the undeniable evidence for the beginning and ending of
persons in our third-person experience. The basic distinction between
oneself as non-sortal and as a person pervaded by properties serves as a
hinge for reflecting on "the afterlife". This
transcendental-phenomenological ontology of necessity deals with some
themes of the philosophy of religion.
