A woman glances at a broken clock and comes to believe it is a quarter
past seven. Yet, despite the broken clock, it really does happen to be a
quarter past seven. Her belief is true, but it isn't knowledge. This is
a classic illustration of a central problem in epistemology: determining
what knowledge requires in addition to true belief. In this provocative
book, Richard Foley finds a new solution to the problem in the
observation that whenever someone has a true belief but not knowledge,
there is some significant aspect of the situation about which she lacks
true beliefs--something important that she doesn't quite "get." This may
seem a modest point but, as Foley shows, it has the potential to
reorient the theory of knowledge. Whether a true belief counts as
knowledge depends on the importance of the information one does or
doesn't have. This means that questions of knowledge cannot be separated
from questions about human concerns and values. It also means that,
contrary to
what is often thought, there is no privileged way of coming to know.
Knowledge is a mutt. Proper pedigree is not required. What matters is
that one doesn't lack important nearby information. Challenging some of
the central assumptions of contemporary epistemology, this is an
original and important account of knowledge.