The Athenian Thucydides (c490-395BC) wrote this history of the
Peloponnesian War between the Spartans and the Athenians, believing that
it would be a greater war than any that had preceded it, and his version
of events would serve as "a possession for all time".
The fragmentary nature of ancient Greece increased the frequency of
conflict, but conversely limited the scale of warfare. Unable to
maintain professional armies, the city-states relied on their own
citizens to fight, reducing the potential duration of campaigns. The
rise of Athens and Sparta as preeminent powers, however, led directly to
the Peloponnesian War, which saw further development of the nature of
warfare, strategy and tactics. Fought between leagues of cities
dominated by Athens and Sparta, the increased manpower and financial
resources increased the scale, and allowed the diversification of
warfare. Set-piece battles during the Peloponnesian war proved
indecisive and instead there was increased reliance on attritionary
strategies, naval battle and blockades and sieges.
This book is essential reading for anyone interested the military
history of the classical world.