Interest in theories of virtue and the place of virtues in the moral
life con- tinues to grow. Nicolai Hartmann [7], George F. Thomas
[20], G. E. M. Anscombe [1], and G. H. von Wright [21], for
example, called to our atten- tion decades ago that virtue had become a
neglected topic in modem ethics. The challenge implicit in these sorts
of reminders to rediscover the contribu- tion that the notion of virtue
can make to moral reasoning, moral character, and moral judgment has not
gone unattended. Arthur Dyck [3], P. T. Geach [5], Josef Pieper
(16], David Hamed [6], and, most notably, Stanley Hauerwas [8-11],
in the theological community, have analyzed or utilized in their work
virtue-based theories of morality. Philosophical probings have come from
Lawrance Becker [2], Philippa Foot [4], Edmund Pincoffs [17],
James Wallace [22], and most notably, Alasdair MacIntyre [12-14].
Draw- ing upon and revising mainly ancient and medieval sources, these
and other commentators have ignited what appears to be the beginning of
a sustained examination of virtue.