This fully illustrated study examines and compares the roles of the US
Navy submarines and the Imperial Japanese Navy's anti-submarine warfare
capabilities during World War II.
The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) began the war by assigning a very low
priority to antisubmarine warfare (ASW). Although Japan heavily depended
on imports to feed its population and war industries, the IJN's
leadership thought the war would be over before shipping losses to US
Navy (USN) submarines began to hurt. The early operations of USN
submarines seemed to confirm these optimistic projections: in 1941-42,
USN submarine operations were largely ineffective. Several factors were
in play, including the faulty Mark XIV torpedo, conservative tactics,
and overly conservative submarine captains. Eventually, though, the
older and ineffective captains were weeded out, and the new generation
of wartime submarine commanders proved aggressive and innovative. When
these qualities were combined with reliable torpedoes, more Gato-class
boats, superb intelligence on Japanese naval and shipping movements, and
the development of advanced radar suitable for employment on submarines,
the results were devastating. Losses to American submarines reached
crippling proportions by 1944. The low priority accorded to ASW by the
IJN resulted in a lack of ASW escorts and modern weaponry, and an
inability to develop tactics.
This superbly illustrated study explores these factors, and the role
that US submarines played in supporting all the major fleet operations
in the Pacific Theater, knotching up almost 500 patrols by war's end for
the loss of 52 submarines to Japanese anti-submarine capabilities. The
technical and tactical developments implemented by the opposing sides
are documented in detail, including improvements to US sub design and
weaponry and more aggressive tactics, and the Japanese development of
destroyer escorts, changes to depth charge design, and improved
submarine detection capacity.
