In recent years a vast literature has been produced on the feasibility
of Artificial Intelligence (AI). The topic most frequently discussed is
the concept of intelligence, with efforts to demonstrate that it is or
is not transferable to the computer. Only rarely has attention been
focused on the concept of the artificial per se in order to clarify what
kind, depth and scope of performance (including intelligence) it could
support. Apart from the classic book by H.A. Simon, The Sciences of the
Artificial, published in 1969, no serious attempt has been made to
define a conceptual frame for understanding the intimate nature of
intelligent machines independently of its claimed or denied human-like
features. The general aim of this book is to discuss, from different
points of view, what we are losing and what we are gaining from the
artificial, particularly from AI, when we abandon the original
anthropomorphic pretension. There is necessarily a need for analysis of
the history of AI and the limits of its plausibility in reproducing the
human mind. In addition, the papers presented here aim at redefining the
epistemology and the possible targets of the AI discipline, raising
problems, and proposing solutions, which should be understood as typical
of the artificial rather than of an information-based conception of man.