This is the story of the RAF anti-shipping Strike Wing based at North
Coates in Lincolnshire, whose Beaufighters from 1943 attacked heavily
defended German convoys transporting raw materials to Rotterdam. During
a little-known but hard-fought two-year campaign, the Wing succeeded in
forcing the enemy's ships off the sea.
From the outset of the Second World War, it was clear that the supply of
raw materials, in particular high grade iron ore from Scandinavia, would
form a crucial element in Germany's ability to maintain its armaments
production. It was not until early 1943, however, after three years of
heavy losses of aircraft and crews, that the RAF implemented an
effective offensive capability against the heavily defended shipping
convoys carrying iron ore and other raw materials into German-controlled
ports.
This volume sets out the strategic challenge the RAF faced in the North
Sea and describes the piecemeal and costly response effected during the
first three years of the conflict when other threats and theaters
claimed a higher strategic priority. It also explains changes in
strategy and tactics introduced through the course of 1942 and
chronicles many of the big Strikes and other operations launched by
North Coates from April 1943 onwards. Moreover, the 'balance sheet',
examination of the anti-shipping campaign performance in general, and
the North Coates Strike Wing in particular - vessels sunk, crews lost
and the wider strategic impact are examined.
Most controversially, the authors suggest that Britain missed an
important strategic opportunity in 1942. A larger, earlier deployment of
Strike Wings, diverting even a small proportion of the enormous
resources allocated to Bomber Command's bombing of German cities, might
have had a greater impact on the Third Reich's industrial production and
with fewer aircrew losses and none of the moral ambiguity associated
with that controversial campaign.
