This volume answers questions that lead to a clearer picture of
third-person self- knowledge, the self-interpretation it embeds, and its
narrative structure. Bringing together current research on third-person
self-knowledge and self-interpretation, the book focuses on third-person
self-knowledge, and the role that narrative and interpretation play in
acquiring it. It regards the third-personal epistemic approach to
oneself as a problem worthy of investigation in its own right, and makes
clear the relation between third-person self-knowledge,
self-interpretation, and narrative capacities.
In recent years, the idea that each person is in a privileged position
to acquire knowledge about her own mental states has come under attack.
A growing body of empirical research has cast doubt upon the existence
of what philosophers call 'first person self-knowledge', i.e., knowledge
about our mental states that is often thought to be immediate,
transparent, and authoritative. This line of thought has led some
philosophers to claim that what seems to be 'first-person
self-knowledge' is really just 'third-person self-knowledge, ' i.e.,
knowledge about our mental states that is inferential, opaque, and
fallible. This book discusses challenges for first-person knowledge and
explores the true nature of third-person knowledge.