For half a century the Soviet economy was inefficient but stable. In the
late 1980s, to the surprise of nearly everyone, it suddenly collapsed.
Why did this happen? And what role did Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's
economic reforms play in the country's dissolution? In this
groundbreaking study, Chris Miller shows that Gorbachev and his allies
tried to learn from the great success story of transitions from
socialism to capitalism, Deng Xiaoping's China. Why, then, were efforts
to revitalize Soviet socialism so much less successful than in China?
Making use of never-before-studied documents from the Soviet politburo
and other archives, Miller argues that the difference between the Soviet
Union and China--and the ultimate cause of the Soviet collapse--was not
economics but politics. The Soviet government was divided by bitter
conflict, and Gorbachev, the ostensible Soviet autocrat, was unable to
outmaneuver the interest groups that were threatened by his economic
reforms. Miller's analysis settles long-standing debates about the
politics and economics of perestroika, transforming our understanding of
the causes of the Soviet Union's rapid demise.