The first full treatment of the unique phenomenon of High Commands in
the Soviet Army during World War II and the Cold War.
The war on the Eastern Front during 1941-45 was an immense struggle,
running from the Barents Sea to the Caucasus Mountains. The vast
distances involved forced the Soviet political-military leadership to
resort to new organizational expedients in order to control operations
along the extended front. These were the high commands of the
directions, which were responsible for two or more fronts (army groups)
and, along maritime axes, one or more fleets.
In all, five high commands were created along the northwestern, western,
southwestern, and North Caucasus strategic directions during 1941-42.
However, the highly unfavorable strategic situation during the first
year of the war, as well as interference in day-to-day operations by
Stalin, severely limited the high commands' effectiveness. As a
consequence, the high commands were abolished in mid-1942 and replaced
by the more flexible system of supreme command representatives at the
front. A High Command of Soviet Forces in the Far East was established
in 1945 and oversaw the Red Army's highly effective campaign against
Japanese forces in Manchuria.
The Far Eastern High Command was briefly resurrected in 1947 as a
response to the tense situation along the Korean peninsula and the
ongoing civil war in China, but was abolished in 1953, soon after
Stalin's death. Growing tensions with China brought about the recreation
of the Far Eastern High Command in 1979, followed a few years later by
the appearance of new high commands in Europe and South Asia. However,
these new high commands did not long survive the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991 and were abolished a year later.
The book relies almost exclusively on Soviet and post-communist archival
and other sources and is the first unclassified treatment of this
subject in any country, East or West.
