Winner of the Emme Award for Astronautical Literature from the American
Astronautical Society
How does one go about organizing something as complicated as a
strategic-missile or space-exploration program? Stephen B. Johnson here
explores the answer--systems management--in a groundbreaking study that
involves Air Force planners, scientists, technical specialists, and,
eventually, bureaucrats. Taking a comparative approach, Johnson focuses
on the theory, or intellectual history, of "systems engineering" as
such, its origins in the Air Force's Cold War ICBM efforts, and its
migration to not only NASA but the European Space Agency.
Exploring the history and politics of aerospace development and weapons
procurement, Johnson examines how scientists and engineers created the
systems management process to coordinate large-scale technology
development, and how managers and military officers gained control of
that process. "Those funding the race demanded results," Johnson
explains. "In response, development organizations created what few
expected and what even fewer wanted--a bureaucracy for innovation. To
begin to understand this apparent contradiction in terms, we must first
understand the exacting nature of space technologies and the concerns of
those who create them."