Modern Belarusian nationalism emerged in the early twentieth century
during a dramatic period that included a mass exodus, multiple
occupations, seven years of warfare, and the partition of the Belarusian
lands. In this original history, Per Anders Rudling traces the evolution
of modern Belarusian nationalism from its origins in late imperial
Russia to the early 1930s.
The revolution of 1905 opened a window of opportunity, and debates
swirled around definitions of ethnic, racial, or cultural belonging. By
March of 1918, a small group of nationalists had declared the formation
of a Belarusian People's Republic (BNR), with territories based on
ethnographic claims. Less than a year later, the Soviets claimed roughly
the same area for a Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR).
Belarusian statehood was declared no less than six times between 1918
and 1920. In 1921, the treaty of Riga officially divided the Belarusian
lands between Poland and the Soviet Union. Polish authorities subjected
Western Belarus to policies of assimilation, alienating much of the
population. At the same time, the Soviet establishment of
Belarusian-language cultural and educational institutions in Eastern
Belarus stimulated national activism in Western Belarus. Sporadic
partisan warfare against Polish authorities occurred until the
mid-1920s, with Lithuanian and Soviet support. On both sides of the
border, Belarusian activists engaged in a process of mythmaking and
national mobilization. By 1926, Belarusian political activism had
peaked, but then waned when coups d'états brought authoritarian rule to
Poland and Lithuania. The year 1927 saw a crackdown on the Western
Belarusian national movement, and in Eastern Belarus, Stalin's
consolidation of power led to a brutal transformation of society and the
uprooting of Belarusian national communists.
As a small group of elites, Belarusian nationalists had been dependent
on German, Lithuanian, Polish, and Soviet sponsors since 1915. The
geopolitical rivalry provided opportunities, but also liabilities. After
1926, maneuvering this complex and progressively hostile landscape
became difficult. Support from Kaunas and Moscow for the Western
Belarusian nationalists attracted the interest of the Polish
authorities, and the increasingly autonomous republican institutions in
Minsk became a concern for the central government in the Kremlin.
As Rudling shows, Belarus was a historic battleground that served as a
political tool, borderland, and buffer zone between greater powers.
Nationalism arrived late, was limited to a relatively small elite, and
was suppressed in its early stages. The tumultuous process, however,
established the idea of Belarusian statehood, left behind a modern
foundation myth, and bequeathed the institutional framework of a
proto-state, all of which resurfaced as building blocks for national
consolidation when Belarus gained independence in 1991.
