The privilege against self-incrimination is often represented in the
case law of England and Wales as a principle of fundamental importance
in the law of criminal procedure and evidence. A logical implication of
recognising a privilege against self-incrimination should be that a
person is not compellable, on pain of a criminal sanction, to provide
information that could reasonably lead to, or increase the likelihood
of, her or his prosecution for a criminal offence. Yet there are
statutory provisions in England and Wales making it a criminal offence
not to provide particular information that, if provided, could be used
in a subsequent prosecution of the person providing it. This book
examines the operation of the privilege against self-incrimination in
criminal proceedings in England and Wales, paying particular attention
to the influence of the European Convention on Human Rights and the
Human Rights Act 1998. Among the questions addressed are how the
privilege might be justified, and whether its scope is clarified
sufficiently in the relevant case law (does the privilege apply, for
example, to pre-existing material?). Consideration is given where
appropriate to the treatment of aspects of the privilege in Australia,
Canada, India, New Zealand, the USA and elsewhere.