Exponents and critics of semantic presupposition have almost invariably
based their discussion on the ('Standard') definition of presupposition
implied by Frege and Strawson. In this study Noel Burton-Roberts argues
convincingly against this definition, that leads it to a three-valued
semantics. He presents a very simple semantic definition which is
weaker, more general and leads to a semantics more easily interpreted as
two-valued with gaps. The author shows that a wide range of intuitive
facts that eluded the Standard definition follow directly from this
('Revised') definition itself: facts about the presuppositions of
compound sentences and modal sentences, about presuppositional conflict
and about differences in the logical status of simple sentences
suffering from presupposition failure. The book includes a detailed
argument that an ambiguity of natural language negation, generally
assumed to be necessary to the defence of semantic presupposition, is
neither possible nor necessary in a presuppositional semantics. Noel
Burton-Roberts has made an authoritative contribution to a debate which
has involved philosophers and linguists for many years. His command of
the issues, his clarity of exposition and his theoretical insight may
well serve to change the boundaries of that debate.