Rich in archival detail and offering a ground-breaking analysis, this
book presents a radically new interpretation of British politics and
policy failings during the Great Famine.
The Irish famine of the 1840s is the biggest humanitarian crisis in the
United Kingdom's history. Within six years of the arrival of the potato
blight in Ireland in 1845, more than a quarter of its residents had
unexpectedly died or emigrated. Its population has not yet fully
recovered since.
Historians have struggled to explain why the British government decided
to shut down its centrally organised relief efforts in 1847, long before
the famine ended. Some have blamed the laissez-faire attitudes of the
time for an inadequate response by the British government; others have
alleged purposeful neglect and genocide. In contrast, The Great Famine
in Ireland and Britain's Financial Crisis uncovers a hidden narrative of
the crisis, which links policy failure in Ireland to financial and
political instability in Great Britain. More important than a
laissez-faire ideology in hindering relief efforts for Ireland were the
British government's lack of a Parliamentary majority from 1846, the
financial crises of 1847, and a battle of ideas over monetary policy
between proponents and opponents of financial orthodoxy. The high death
toll in Ireland resulted from the British government's plans for
intervention going awry, rather than being prematurely cancelled because
of laissez-faire.
This book is essential reading for scholars, students and anyone
interested in Anglo-Irish relations, the history of financial crises and
famines, and why humanitarian-relief efforts can go wrong even with good
intentions.
