The subtitle of this book should be read as a qualification as much as
an elaboration of the title. If the goal were completeness, then this
book would have included essays on the work of other philosophers such
as Wilfrid Sellars, Nicholas Rescher, Donald Davidson, Gilbert Harman
and Michael Williams. Although it would be incorrect to say that each of
these writers has set forth a version of the coherence theory of
justification and knowledge, it is clear that their work is directly
relevant, and reaction to it could easily fill a companion volume. This
book concentrates, however, on the theories of Keith Lehrer and Laurence
BonJour, and I doubt that any epistemologist would deny that they are
presently the two leading proponents of coherentism. A sure indication
of this was the ease with which the papers in this volume were solicited
and delivered. The many authors represented here were willing, prepared,
and excited to join in the discussion of BonJour's and Lehrer's recent
writings. I thank each one personally for agreeing so freely to
contribute. All of the essays but two are published for the first time
here. Marshall Swain's and Alvin Goldman's papers were originally
presented at a symposium on BonJour's The Structure of Empirical
Knowledge at the annual meeting of the Central Division of the American
Philosophical Association, Chicago, Illinois, in April, 1987.