My curiosity with the economic efficiency and social benefits of
provisions used by telecommunications carriers to limit their liability
to customers for damages arising from service interruptions and network
outages is a longstanding one. It began with the changing state
regulatory environments in the late 1980's while representing AT&T as an
attorney before numerous state legislatures in the Midwest. As
telecommunications carriers faced the ramifications of deregulation,
several legal consequences came to the fore. One important consequence
was the impact of changing regulatory rules and requirements on the
carriers' abilities to continue to limit their liability for damages to
customers in a non-tariffed world. As a result, one of my
responsibilities while employed by AT&T was to syek legislative relief
in some state jurisdictions which would enable the continued use of
limited liability provisions notwithstanding other deregulatory
developments in the industry. In my capacity as an attorney, I succeeded
in this task in the few jurisdictions for which I was given the charge.
However, as an economist, these efforts piqued my interest regarding the
economic effects of such limited liability provisions on consumer
interests. What liability rules for the industry would really better
serve general societal interests? As my career evolved, which involved
returning to graduate school to pursue my Ph. D. and becoming the
Director of Public Policy Studies at Ameritech, I had the opportunity to
pursue interdisciplinary research in telecommunications policy issues.
