In contrast to every other book about the conflict Andrew Lambert's
ground-breaking study The Crimean War: British Grand Strategy against
Russia, 1853-1856 is neither an operational history of the armies in the
Crimea, nor a study of the diplomacy of the conflict. The core concern
is with grand strategy, the development and implementation of national
policy and strategy. The key concepts are strategic, derived from the
works of Carl von Clausewitz and Sir Julian Corbett, and the main focus
is on naval, not military operations. This original approach rejected
the 'Continentalist' orthodoxy that dominated contemporary writing about
the history of war, reflecting an era when British security policy was
dominated by Inner German Frontier, the British Army of the Rhine and
Air Force Germany. Originally published in 1990 the book appeared just
as the Cold War ended; the strategic landscape for Britain began
shifting away from the continent, and new commitments were emerging that
heralded a return to maritime strategy, as adumbrated in the defence
policy papers of the 1990s. With a new introduction that contextualises
the 1990 text and situates it in the developing historiography of the
Crimean War the new edition makes this essential book available to a new
generation of scholars.