The Central Intelligence Agency was established by Harry S. Truman after
World War II and it soon provided covert political and paramilitary
support to further US foreign policy. Strengthened by President
Eisenhower, by the early 1950s, under the command of Allen Dulles, the
CIA was actively overthrowing governments-notably Prime Minister
Mossadegh in Iran in 1953 and President Arbenz Guzman in Guatemala in
1954. The Agency was less effective in Eastern Europe, however, where
the Soviet Union had established control- despite opportunities for US
intereference such as the East German riots in 1953 and the Hungarian
Revolution of 1956. Here, Stephen Long challenges the accepted view that
the US believed in a post- World War II ordering of Europe which placed
the East outside an American 'sphere of influence'. He argues instead
that 'disorder prevailed over design' in the planning and organization
of intelligence operations during the early stages of the Cold War, and
that the period represents a missed opportunity for the US during the
Cold War.
Featuring new archival material and a new approach which seeks to unpick
the relationship between the CIA, the US government and the Soviet
Union, The CIA and the Soviet Bloc sheds new light on espionage, the
Cold War, US diplomatic history and the history of twentieth-century
Europe.