At independence, Cameroon and Nigeria adhered to the OAU principle of
uti possedetis juris by inheriting the colonial administrative borders
whose delineation in some parts was either imperfect or not demarcated
or both. The two countries tried to correct these anomalies. But such
efforts were later thwarted by incessant geostrategic reckoning,
dilatory, and diversionary tactics in the seventies and eighties that
persisted and resurfaced in the nineties with a more determined posture.
On two occasions, the border conflict almost boiled over to a full-scale
war. First, in May 1981 when there was the exchange of fire between
Cameroonian and Nigerian coast guards and second, in February 1994 when
Nigeria marched her troops into Cameroon's Bakassi Peninsula. Elsewhere
in Africa, border incidents like these have often degenerated into war.
But Cameroon and Nigeria together with the international community
managed these protracted incidents from escalating into war. This book
examines the part played by the disputing parties, Cameroon and Nigeria;
the mediation, conciliatory and adjudicatory role of third parties;
regional and international organisations, in the process of the
resolution of the border dispute from 1981-2011. The study situates the
nature and dynamics of the dispute historically, and comprehensively
explores in detail its causes, settlement and resolution.
