Buchanan and Tullock's seminal work, The Calculus of Consent, linked
economic methodology to substantive questions in political science.
Among the major contributions of the book is a connection between
constitutional decision making and contractarianism, a philosophical
tradition that proponents believe can give institutions legitimacy. In
other words, a major contribution of their book is a clear connection
between empirical decision making and normative principles. This book
formalizes and extends this foundational work as it attempts to show how
economic and philosophical arguments about the "best" voting rules can
be used to improve constitutional design. It informs debates about
constitutional political economy in comparative politics, democratic
theory, and public choice. Political scientists often ask questions
about what causes a nation to seek a new constitution, how constitutions
are made, and what factors allow for corruption in constitutional
decision making. The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design
bridges the gap between normative questions about which institutions are
most efficient and fair and empirical questions about how constitutions
are formed. This provides a benchmark to help create better
constitutions and informs empirical research about what institutions are
most likely to succeed.
The book begins by showing how contractarian ideals can be used to
justify choices about decision-making. It then carefully defines several
concepts employed by Buchanan and Tullock and shows why the
relationships between these concepts may not be as closely linked as
Buchanan and Tullock first thought. This provides a backdrop for
analyzing the three phases of constitutional decision-making: 1) the
constitutional phase, where rules for constitutional decision making
must be justified; 2) the legislative phase, where the optimal
k-majority rule1 is analyzed; and 3) the electoral phase, where the
optimal voting rule for large electorates and open alternatives are
determined. These phases differ by context and sources of legitimacy.
Computational models and analytic techniques are introduced in each of
these chapters. Finally, the book concludes with statements about the
significance of the research for the creation of constitutions more
broadly.
