When the French declared war on Great Britain in 1793, they undermined
the chosen policy of William Pitt, which had been to avoid conflict in
order to repair the nation's finances. The result of this policy was an
understrength and inadequately resourced army. Whether campaigning on
the continent in coalition with other European powers or picking up the
colonial possessions of France and her allies, this army did little to
add to its reputation.
Yet, despite appearances, as the decade progressed there could be no
doubt that improvements were taking place. When it was decided in 1800
that the French Army of the Orient, abandoned by Bonaparte, could be
ejected from Egypt, the troops sent to achieve this objective were of a
very different quality from those that had been dispatched to Flanders
in 1793. This study analyses that force and its commanders, examines the
preparations that contributed so notably to its success, and evaluates
why it was able to take the fight to a battle-hardened Revolutionary
force and defeat it.