The first of two volumes on the Axis campaigns in the Balkans,
exploring Mussolini's fateful decision to move against Greece in October
1940. The Greek President Metaxas rejected the Italian ultimatum with a
famous 'Oxi' ('No'), and what followed was Italy's first debacle in
World War II.
In the wake of Italy's rapid annexation of Albania in April 1940,
Mussolini's decision to attack Greece in October that year is widely
acknowledged as a fatal mistake, leading to a domestic crisis and to the
collapse of Italy's reputation as a military power (re-emphasized by the
Italian defeat in North Africa in December 1940). The Italian assault on
Greece came to a stalemate in less than a fortnight, and was followed a
week later by a Greek counter-offensive that broke through the Italian
defences before advancing into Albania, forcing the Italian forces to
withdraw north before grinding to a half in January 1941 due to
logistical issues. Eventually, the Italians took advantage of this brief
hiatus to reorganize and prepare a counteroffensive, the failure of
which marked the end of the first stage of the Axis Balkan campaign.
The first of two volumes examining the Axis campaigns in the Balkans,
this book offers a detailed overview of the Italian and Greek armies,
their fighting power, and the terrain in which they fought. Complimented
by rarely seen images and full color illustrations, it shows how
expectations of an easy Italian victory quickly turned into one of
Mussolini's greatest blunders.
