This study analyses the legal and statutory environment for investments
in football clubs in Germany, as opposed to the situation in England.
Whereas German regulations limit the acquisition of shares of football
clubs, the legal framework is much more liberal in England. The paper
looks at the potential conflicts of interest involved with club
ownership issues as well as at the arguments for and against the German
'50 plus 1' rule and how this rule may cause a shortfall in
competitiveness as compared to English football. Finally, the study
looks at doubts over the lawfulness of the rule in relation to European
antitrust legislation and doubts over its effectiveness concerning legal
loopholes provided by German corporation law. The paper relied
predominantly on the analysis of literature concerning the regulation of
club ownership in England and Germany, whereas a significant amount of
German literature was used. Essentially, the research found that there
is reason for severe scepticism about both the lawfulness and the
effectiveness of the '50 plus 1' rule. It would probably not bear up
against a test before the European Court of Justice. There are several
opportunities in German corporate law to circumvent the rule. Finally,
the paper urges the German Football Association (DFB) to consider a
softening of the regulations currently in place, and effective
modifications of the underlying licensing system, respectively, as well
as the introduction of supporters' trusts and fit and proper person
tests. Finally, the paper claims that competitive balance on a European
club level can only be restored if club ownership issues are resolved on
a European level.
