Nowadays remembered mostly through Adam Smith's references to the
short-lived Ayr Bank in the Wealth of Nations, the 1772-3 financial
crisis was an important historical episode in its own right, taking
place during a pivotal period in the development of financial capitalism
and coinciding with the start of the traditional industrialisation
narrative. It was also one of the earliest purely financial crises
occurring in peacetime, and its progress showed an impressive
geographical reach, involving England, Scotland, the Netherlands and the
North American colonies.
This book uses a variety of previously unpublished archival sources to
question the bubble narrative usually associated with this crisis, and
to identify the mechanisms of financial contagion that allowed the
failure of a small private bank in London to cause rapid and severe
distress throughout the 18th century financial system. It re-examines
the short and turbulent career of the Ayr Bank, and concludes that its
failure was the result of cavalier liability management akin to that of
Northern Rock in 2007, rather than the poor asset quality alleged in
existing literature. It furthermore argues that the Bank of England's
prompt efforts to contain the crisis are evidence of a Lender of Last
Resort in action, some thirty years before the classical formulation of
the concept by Henry Thornton.