The German panzer armies that swept into the Soviet Union in 1941 were
an undefeated force that had honed their skill in combined arms warfare
to a fine edge. The Germans focused their panzers and tactical air
support at points on the battlefield defined as Schwerpunkt - main
effort - to smash through any defensive line and then advance to
envelope their adversaries.
Initially, these methods worked well in the early days of Operation
Barbarossa and the tank forces of the Red Army suffered defeat after
defeat. Although badly mauled in the opening battles, the Red Army's
tank forces did not succumb to the German armored onslaught and German
planning and logistical deficiencies led to over-extension and failure
in 1941. In the second year of the invasion, the Germans directed their
Schwerpunkt toward the Volga and the Caucasus and again achieved some
degree of success, but the Red Army had grown much stronger and by
November 1942, the Soviets were able to turn the tables at Stalingrad.
Robert Forczyk's incisive study offers fresh insight into how the two
most powerful mechanized armies of the Second World War developed their
tactics and weaponry during the critical early years of the Russo-German
War. He uses German, Russian and English sources to provide the first
comprehensive overview and analysis of armored warfare from the German
and Soviet perspectives. His analysis of the greatest tank war in
history is compelling reading.