In this book I address a dichotomy that is as central as any in
ontology - that between ordinary objects or substances and the various
attributes (Le., properties, kinds, and relations) we associate with
them. My aim is to arrive at the correct philosophical account of each
member of the dichotomy. What I shall argue is that the various attempts
to understand substances or attri- butes in reductive terms fail. Talk
about attributes, I shall try to show, is just that - talk about
attributes; and, likewise, talk about substances is just tha- talk about
substances. The result is what many will find a strange combina- tion of
views - a Platonistic theory of attributes, where attributes are univer-
sals or multiply exemplifiable entities whose existence is independent
of "the world of flux", and an Aristotelian theory of substance, where
substances are basic unities not reducible to metaphysically more
fundamental kinds of things. Part One is concerned with the ontology of
attributes. After distinguishing three different patterns of
metaphysical thinking about attributes, I examine, in turn, the
phenomena of predication, resemblance, and higher order quanti-
fication. I argue that none of these phenomena by itself is sufficient
to establish the inescapability of a Platonistic interpretation of
attributes. Then, I discuss the phenomenon of abstract reference as it
is exhibited in the use of abstract singular terms.