Kawalec's monograph is a novel defence of the programme of inductive
logic, developed initially by Rudolf Carnap in the 1950s and Jaakko
Hintikka in the 1960s. It revives inductive logic by bringing out the
underlying epistemology. The main strength of the work is its link
between inductive logic and contemporary discussions of epistemology.
Through this perspective the author succeeds to shed new light on the
significance of inductive logic. The resulting structural reliabilist
theory propounds the view that justification supervenes on syntactic and
semantic properties of sentences as justification-bearers. The claim is
made that this sets up a genuine alternative to the prevailing theories
of justification. Kawalec substantiates this claim by confronting
structural reliabilism with a number of epistemological problems.
Therefore, the book is interesting for philosophers of science dealing
with problems of induction, but it will also appeal to readers working
in the theory of knowledge. Kawalec writes in a clear manner, makes his
theses and arguments explicit, and gives ample bibliographical
references. The book will be a valuable companion to graduate and
postgraduate courses on inductive logic.