The story of what really led to Germany losing the battle of
Stalingrad - the inability of the Luftwaffe to keep Sixth Army supplied
throughout the winter of 1942-43 - and why this crucial
airlift failed.
Luftwaffe chief Hermann Goering's failure to deliver his promise to keep
Sixth Army supplied at Stalingrad was one of the most hard-hitting
strategic air failures of World War II. 300 tons a day of supplies were
required to sustain the Sixth Army, flown in against a Soviet fighter
force whose capabilities were rapidly being transformed. The Luftwaffe's
failure left Sixth Army trapped, vulnerable and too weak to attempt a
breakout.
The destruction of Sixth Army was one of the major turning points in
World War II but the Luftwaffe's crucial role in this disaster has often
been overlooked. Some claim the attempt was doomed from the beginning
but, in this intriguing book, author William E. Hiestand explains how
the Germans had amassed sufficient aircraft to, at least theoretically,
provide the supplies needed. Demands of aircraft maintenance, awful
weather and, in particular, the Soviet air blockade crippled the airlift
operation. In addition, the employment of increasing numbers of modern
aircraft by the Soviet Air Force using more flexible tactics, coupled
with Chief Marshal Novikov's superior Air Army organisation proved
decisive.
The Luftwaffe did eventually recover and mounted focused operations for
control of limited areas of the Eastern Front, but overall it had lost
its dominance. Packed with strategic diagrams and maps, archive photos
and artwork of aerial battles over Stalingrad, and including bird's eye
views of Operation Winter Storm and airlift operations and tactics,
this title clearly demonstrates how the Luftwaffe lost its strategic
initiative in the air.
