For the philosopher interested in the idea of objective knowledge of the
real world, the nature of science is of special importance, for science,
and more particularly physics, is today considered to be paradigmatic in
its affording of such knowledge. And no understand- ing of science is
complete until it includes an appreciation of the nature of the relation
between successive scientific theories-that is, until it includes a
conception of scientific progress. Now it might be suggested by some
that there are a variety of ways in which science progresses, or that
there are a number of different notions of scientific progress, not all
of which concern the relation between successive scientific theories.
For example, it may be thought that science progresses through the
application of scientific method to areas where it has not previously
been applied, or, through the development of individual theories.
However, it is here suggested that the application of the methods of
science to new areas does not concern forward progress so much as
lateral expansion, and that the provision of a conception of how
individual theories develop would lack the generality expected of an
account concerning the progress of science itself.