block possible Soviet expansion by mobilizing European "democracies",
the policy soon extended to some developing countries in Asia and Latin
America. In response, the USSR gradually initiated development programs
for newly independent nations in Asia and Africa. In this context, super
power rivalry operated in the South to (i) expand spheres of influence
and control; (ii) guard Southern nations from the influence and
incursions launched by the opposed camp; (iii) stimulate indigenous
development. With few exceptions, Southern nations provided little input
to the definition and execution of North-South dynamics during this
period. In the case of Africa and to some extent Asia, the acquisition
of independence was so recent and often sudden that there was little
time to reflect on the kind of policies and measures needed to build
bal- anced relations with the former mother country. In Latin America,
the Monroe Doctrine had long insured that the region was a virtual
captive of the US. Aid for development was contingent on conformity to
US political and economic interests. The cognitive component of
South-North dealings strongly reflected the two above mentioned
dispositions. The relative lack of political experience in the South.
and the dearth of an organized and sizable intellectual/academic
community, meant that there were few cognitive and human resources for
undertaking careful study and analysis of the conditions and needs of
develop- ment from a Southern perspective (influential exceptions
existed though, such as Raul Prebisch in Latin America or Ghandi in
India).
