The politics of scientific advice across four environmental conflicts
in Chile, when the state acted as a "neutral broker" rather than
protecting the common good.
In Science and Environment in Chile, Javiera Barandiarán examines the
consequences for environmental governance when the state lacks the
capacity to produce an authoritative body of knowledge. Focusing on the
experience of Chile after it transitioned from dictatorship to
democracy, she examines a series of environmental conflicts in which the
state tried to act as a "neutral broker" rather than the protector of
the common good. She argues that this shift in the role of the
state--occurring in other countries as well--is driven in part by the
political ideology of neoliberalism, which favors market mechanisms and
private initiatives over the actions of state agencies. Chile has not
invested in environmental science labs, state agencies with in-house
capacities, or an ancillary network of trusted scientific
advisers--despite the growing complexity of environmental problems and
increasing popular demand for more active environmental stewardship.
Unlike a high modernist "empire" state with the scientific and technical
capacity to undertake large-scale projects, Chile's model has been that
of an "umpire" state that purchases scientific advice from markets.
After describing the evolution of Chilean regulatory and scientific
institutions during the transition, Barandiarán describes four
environmental crises that shook citizens' trust in government: the
near-collapse of the farmed salmon industry when an epidemic killed
millions of fish; pollution from a paper and pulp mill that killed off
or forced out thousands of black-neck swans; a gold mine that threatened
three glaciers; and five controversial mega-dams in Patagonia.
