The Age of Enlightenment has often been portrayed as a dogmatic period
on account of the veritable worship of reason and progress that
characterized Eighteenth Century thinkers. Even today the philosophes
are considered to have been completely dominated in their thinking by an
optimism that leads to dogmatism and ultimately rationalism. However, on
closer inspection, such a conception seems untenable, not only after
careful study of the impact of scepticism on numerous intellectual
domains in the period, but also as a result of a better understanding of
the character of the Enlightenment. As Giorgio Tonelli has rightly
observed: "the Enlightenment was indeed the Age of Reason but one of the
main tasks assigned to reason in that age was to set its own
boundaries." Thus, given the growing number of works devoted to the
scepticism of Enlightenment thinkers, historians of philosophy have
become increasingly aware of the role played by scepticism in the
Eighteenth Century, even in those places once thought to be most given
to dogmatism, especially Germany. Nevertheless, the deficiencies of
current studies of Enlightenment scepticism are undeniable. In taking up
this question in particular, the present volume, which is entirely
devoted to the scepticism of the Enlightenment in both its historical
and geographical dimensions, seeks to provide readers with a revaluation
of the alleged decline of scepticism. At the same time it attempts to
resituate the Pyrrhonian heritage within its larger context and to
recapture the fundamental issues at stake. The aim is to construct an
alternative conception of Enlightenment philosophy, by means of
philosophical modernity itself, whose initial stages can be found
herein.
