An analysis of the discrepancy between the ways Supreme Court Justice
Antonin Scalia argued the Constitution should be interpreted versus how
he actually interpreted the law
Antonin Scalia is considered one of the most controversial justices to
have been on the United States Supreme Court. A vocal advocate of
textualist interpretation, Justice Scalia argued that the Constitution
means only what it says and that interpretations of the document should
be confined strictly to the directives supplied therein. This narrow
form of constitutional interpretation, which limits constitutional
meaning to the written text of the Constitution, is known as textualism.
Scalia v. Scalia: Opportunistic Textualism in Constitutional
Interpretation examines Scalia's discussions of textualism in his
speeches, extrajudicial writings, and judicial opinions. Throughout his
writings, Scalia argues textualism is the only acceptable form of
constitutional interpretation. Yet Scalia does not clearly define his
textualism, nor does he always rely upon textualism to the exclusion of
other interpretive means.
Scalia is seen as the standard bearer for textualism. But when
textualism fails to support his ideological aims (as in cases that
pertain to states' rights or separation of powers), Scalia reverts to
other forms of argumentation. Langford analyzes Scalia's opinions in a
clear area of law, the cruel and unusual punishment clause; a contested
area of law, the free exercise and establishment cases; and a silent
area of law, abortion. Through her analysis, Langford shows that Scalia
uses rhetorical strategies beyond those of a textualist approach,
concluding that Scalia is an opportunistic textualist and that
textualism is as rhetorical as any other form of judicial
interpretation.
