After a gap of two years, the 1812 Salamanca Campaign saw Wellington
taking the offensive in Spain against Marshal Marmont's Army of
Portugal. Marching from the border fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo which fell
to the Allies in January, neither commander was willing to take the risk
of a general action without a clear tactical advantage. The result were
stand-offs as Wellington offered battle on the San Christóbal Heights,
but once the small French-garrisoned forts left behind in Salamanca
fell, Marmont withdrew to the Douro. For over a week the two armies
shared cooling waters of the river before Marmont 'humbugged' Wellington
and fell on the Allied left flank at Castrejón. Wellington rushed to the
aid of the Light and 4th divisions with the heavy cavalry. Over the
following days Marmont dexterously maneuvered Wellington back towards
Salamanca, with both armies within cannon shot still not risking
battle.
When it seemed Wellington would have to march back to the safety of
Portugal, Marmont finally made a mistake on the plains south of
Salamanca on 22 July 1812, by allowing his army to become over extended.
Wellington saw what was happening and after weeks of marching and
counter marching, the battle the soldiers earnestly hoped for was on.
In the past it has been difficult to place the fighting on the ground in
the center of the Salamanca battlefield, where 'vast clouds of smoke and
dust that rolled along the basin' obscured vision even for those
fighting. Supplementing their letters, diaries and memoirs with modern
geographical aids, archaeology and a stout pair of boots, it is now
possible to reconcile the sequence of the battle with locations, in a
way in which it was not feasible even a few years ago.