Useful overview of politico-military relations between Byzantium and
the Islamic world (Arab and then Seljuk Turkish) from 6th century.
In August 1071, the Byzantine Emperor Romanus IV Diogenese led out a
powerful army in an attempt to roll back Seljuk Turkish incursions into
the Anatolian heartland of the Empire. Outmaneuvered by the Turkish
sultan, Alp Arslan, Romanus was forced to give battle with only half his
troops near Manzikert. By the end of that fateful day much of the
Byzantine army was dead, the rest scattered in flight and the Emperor
himself a captive.
As a result, the Anatolian heart was torn out of the Empire and it was
critically weakened, while Turkish power expanded rapidly, eventually
leading to Byzantine appeals for help from Western Europe, thus
prompting the First Crusade. This book sets the battle in the context of
the military history of the Byzantine Empire and the Islamic World (Arab
and Seljuk Turkish) up to the pivotal engagement at Manzikert in 1071,
with special emphasis on the origins, course and outcome of this battle.
The composition, weapons and tactics of the very different opposing
armies are analyzed. The final chapter is dedicated to assessing the
impact of Manzikert on the Byzantine Empire's strategic position in
Anatolia and to the battle's role as a causus belli for the Crusades.
Dozens of maps and battle diagrams support the clear text.
