What are human beings like? How is knowledge possible? What is truth?
Where do moral values come from? Questions like these have stood at the
center of Western philosophy for centuries. In addressing them,
philosophers have made certain fundamental assumptions-that we can know
our own minds by introspection, that most of our thinking about the
world is literal, and that reason is disembodied and universal-that are
now called into question by well-established results of cognitive
science. It has been shown empirically that: Most thought is
unconscious. We have no direct conscious access to the mechanisms of
thought and language. Our ideas go by too quickly and at too deep a
level for us to observe them in any simple way. Abstract concepts are
mostly metaphorical. Much of the subject matter of philosophy, such as
the nature of time, morality, causation, the mind, and the self, relies
heavily on basic metaphors derived from bodily experience. What is
literal in our reasoning about such concepts is minimal and conceptually
impoverished. All the richness comes from metaphor. For instance, we
have two mutually incompatible metaphors for time, both of which
represent it as movement through space: in one it is a flow past us and
in the other a spatial dimension we move along. Mind is embodied.
Thought requires a body-not in the trivial sense that you need a
physical brain to think with, but in the profound sense that the very
structure of our thoughts comes from the nature of the body. Nearly all
of our unconscious metaphors are based on common bodily experiences.
Most of the central themes of the Western philosophical tradition are
called into question by these findings. The Cartesian person, with a
mind wholly separate from the body, does not exist. The Kantian person,
capable of moral action according to the dictates of a universal reason,
does not exist. The phenomenological person, capable of knowing his or
her mind entirely through introspection alone, does not exist. The
utilitarian person, the Chomskian person, the poststructuralist person,
the computational person, and the person defined by analytic philosophy
all do not exist. Then what does? Lakoff and Johnson show that a
philosophy responsible to the science of mind offers radically new and
detailed understandings of what a person is. After first describing the
philosophical stance that must follow from taking cognitive science
seriously, they re-examine the basic concepts of the mind, time,
causation, morality, and the self: then they rethink a host of
philosophical traditions, from the classical Greeks through Kantian
morality through modern analytic philosophy. They reveal the
metaphorical structure underlying each mode of thought and show how the
metaphysics of each theory flows from its metaphors. Finally, they take
on two major issues of twentieth-century philosophy: how we conceive
rationality, and how we conceive language.
