Despite the ongoing preventive actions, supervision failure remains the
most serious contributor to aircraft accidents in the Brazilian Air
Force (FAB). The Organizational Accidents Theory, introduced by James
Reason (1997), focuses on the preexisting conditions that result from
fallible decisions made by top management. Squadron Commanders are the
managers who deal directly with frontline operations in the FAB,
becoming the last managerial barriers to counteract flaw top-down
decision-makings. The purpose of this study aims to assess squadron
commanders' perceptions regarding the theory of Organizational Accidents
to improve FAB's safety performance. Three research hypotheses have been
formulated and answered. Surveys were sent to squadron commanders and 20
responded to them. Despite the basic understanding of aviation safety,
the results show that squadron commanders need more education in
advanced safety models as well as the theory of Organizational
Accidents. Squadron Commanders also need a better decision-making
process tailored for their managerial decisions.