1 Informal Institution and Accounting: Introduction and Outline1.1 The
Aim of this Book1.2 Core Concepts1.2.1 Accounting Behavior1.2.2 Formal
Institutions and Informal Institutions1.3 The Coexistence between Formal
and Informal Institutions: A Diagram1.4 The Relation between Formal
Institutions and Informal Institutions1.5 Layout and Content of This
Book1.6 The Potential Theoretical Contributions1.7 Extended Readings1.8
ConclusionReference2 Auditor-CEO Surname Sharing and Financial
Misstatement2.1 Introduction2.2 Institutional Background, Literature
Review, and Hypotheses Development2.2.1 Surname and Its Influence in
Contemporary China2.2.2 The Chinese Audit Market and Auditor
Independence2.2.3 Literature Review2.2.4Auditor-CEO Surname Sharing and
Financial Misstatement2.2.5 Rare Surname versus Common Surname2.3
Research Design2.3.1Empirical Model Specification for Hypothesis 12.3.2
Empirical Model Specification for Hypothesis 22.3.3 Sample2.3.4 Data
Source2.4 Results2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics2.4.2 Pearson Correlation
Analysis2.4.3 Regression Results of Hypothesis 12.4.4 Regression Results
of Hypothesis 252.4.5 Robustness Checks Using the Number of Signing
Auditors Sharing the Same Surname with theCEO2.4.6 Robustness Checks
Using Other Measures of Financial Misstatement2.4.7 Robustness Checks
Using the Expanded Samples2.5 Endogeneity and Additional Tests2.5.1
Time-Series Tests Using an Exogenous Regulatory Event2.5.2 Subsample
Tests Using an Exogenous Regulatory Event2.5.3 Additional Tests Using
both Time and Individual Effects under an Exogenous Regulatory
Event2.5.4 Endogeneity Tests Using the Propensity Score Matching
Approach2.5.5 The Effects of Auditor-CEO Surname Sharing on MAO and
Abnormal Audit Fees2.5.6 Cross-Sectional Analysis Considering
Institutional Environment2.5.7 Additional Tests Considering Auditor-CEO
Hometown Relationship and School Ties2.5.8 Additional Tests Based on the
Integrated Variables Combining Surname Sharing and
HometownRelationship2.6 Conclusion, Managerial Implications, and
LimitationsReference3 CEO-Director Surname Connectedness and Corporate
Misconduct3.1 Introduction3.2 Institutional Background, Literature
Review, Hypotheses Development3.2.1 Surname in the Chinese Context3.2.2
Prior Literature on Surname Distribution and Surname Connectedness3.2.3
Prior Literature on Corporate Misconduct3.2.4 The Influence of
CEO-Director Surname Connectedness on Corporate Misconduct3.2.5 The
Moderating Effect of the popularity of the CEO's surname3.3 Research
Design3.3.1 Empirical Model Specification for H13.3.2 Empirical Model
Specification for H23.3.3 Research Sample Identification3.3.4 Data
Source3.4 Empirical Findings3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics3.4.2 Pearson
Correlation Analysis63.4.3Multivariate Test of H1 and H2 (Main
Findings)3.4.4 Robustness Checks Using the Ratio of CEO-Director Surname
Connectedness3.4.5Robustness Checks Using the Number of Corporate
Misconduct3.5 Endogeneity and Additional Tests3.5.1 Endogeneity Tests
Using the Propensity Score Matching Approach3.5.2 Additional Tests3.6
Conclusions, Managerial Implications, and LimitationsReference4
CEO-Auditor Hometown Complex and Pre-IPO Earnings Management4.1
Introduction4.2 Institutional Back
