This is a collection of essays on Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinian
themes that appeared between 1996 and 2019. It is divided into three
parts, with a common trajectory laid out in a substantial introduction.
The first part links meaning, necessity and normativity. It defends and
modifies Wittgenstein's claim that the idea of a 'grammatical rule'
holds the key to understanding linguistic meaning and its connection to
necessary propositions. The second part elucidates the connections
between meaning, concepts and thought in Wittgenstein and beyond. It
shows how he laid the grounds for a sound understanding of four
contested issues--radical interpretation, concepts, nonsense and the
scope and limits of animal thought. The third part provides a qualified
defence of Wittgenstein's influential yet extremely controversial idea
that philosophical problems are conceptual, and thereby rooted in
confusions concerning the meanings of and semantic relations between
linguistic expressions. Against irrationalist interpretations, Glock
demonstrates that Wittgenstein's method is argumentative rather than
therapeutic.
The essays reconstruct Wittgenstein's writings in a way that identifies
the often cryptic problems and arguments in his work. This sets them
apart from a currently popular trend of therapeutic interpretations, as
in the 'New Wittgenstein' school. By contrast to other critics of such
interpretations, Glock acknowledges that they are to a limited extent
warranted by some aspects of Wittgenstein's work, e.g. concerning the
notion of nonsense or what he calls 'the myth of mere method'. At the
same time the essays convincingly criticize these aspects and show that
they are not presupposed by the more important lessons that Wittgenstein
still has to teach.
The collection brings out the abiding relevance of Wittgenstein's
reflections to contemporary debates on central themes such as the
importance of normativity, the foundations of meaning and necessity, the
nature of concepts, the possibility of animal thought and the proper
method of philosophy.
