This book introduces concepts in philosophy of mind and neurophilosophy.
Inside, three scholars offer approaches to the problems of identity,
consciousness, and the mind. In the process, they open new vistas for
thought and raise fresh controversies to some of the oldest problems in
philosophy.
The first chapter focuses on the identity problem. The author employs an
explanatory model he christened sense-phenomenalism to defend the thesis
that personal identity is something or a phenomenon that pertains to the
observable/perceptible aspect of the human person.
The next chapter explores the problem of consciousness. It deploys the
new concept equiphenomenalism as a model to show that mental properties
are not by-products but necessary products of consciousness. Herein, the
notion of qualia is a fundamental and necessary product that must be
experienced simultaneously with neural activities for consciousness to
be possible.
The last chapter addresses the mind/body problem. It adopts the new
concept proto-phenomenalism as an alternative explanatory model. This
model eliminates the idea of a mind. As such, it approaches the
mind-body problem from a materialistic point of view with many
implications such as, the meaning(lessness) of our existence, the
possibility of thought engineering as well as religious implications.