Normativity concerns what we ought to think or do and the evaluations we
make. For example, we say that we ought to think consistently, we ought
to keep our promises, or that Mozart is a better composer than Salieri.
Yet what philosophical moral can we draw from the apparent absence of
normativity in the scientific image of the world? For scientific
naturalists, the moral is that the normative must be reduced to the
nonnormative, while for nonnaturalists, the moral is that there must be
a transcendent realm of norms.
Naturalism and Normativity engages with both sides of this debate.
Essays explore philosophical options for understanding normativity in
the space between scientific naturalism and Platonic supernaturalism.
They articulate a liberal conception of philosophy that is neither
reducible to the sciences nor completely independent of them--yet one
that maintains the right to call itself naturalism. Contributors think
in new ways about the relations among the scientific worldview, our
experience of norms and values, and our movements in the space of
reason. Detailed discussions include the relationship between philosophy
and science, physicalism and ontological pluralism, the realm of the
ordinary, objectivity and subjectivity, truth and justification, and the
liberal naturalisms of Donald Davidson, John Dewey, John McDowell, and
Ludwig Wittgenstein.
