Philippa Foot has for many years been one of the most distinctive and
influential thinkers in moral philosophy. Long dissatisfied with the
moral theories of her contemporaries, she has gradually evolved a theory
of her own that is radically opposed not only to emotivism and
prescriptivism but also to the whole subjectivist, anti-naturalist
movement deriving from David Hume. Dissatisfied with both Kantian and
utilitarian ethics, she claims to have isolated a special form of
evaluation that predicates goodness and defect only to living things
considered as such; she finds this form of evaluation in moral
judgements. Her vivid discussion covers topics such as practical
rationality, erring conscience, and the relation between virtue and
happiness, ending with a critique of Nietzsche's immoralism. This
long-awaited book exposes a highly original approach to moral philosophy
and represents a fundamental break from the assumptions of recent
debates. Foot challenges many prominent
philosophical arguments and attitudes; but hers is a work full of life
and feeling, written for anyone intrigued by the deepest questions about
goodness and human.