Much of the existing accounts assume that investment treaties affect
national governance. However, how exactly this happens has been subject
to little analysis. Conventional accounts presume that these treaties
improve national governance, leading to good governance and the rule of
law for all. Critical accounts charge that investment treaties unduly
empower foreign investors and cause a regulatory chill. On both
accounts, investment treaties are expected to empower and constrain.
Comparing extended case studies of Argentina, the Czech Republic, India
and Mexico, this book shows how investment treaties influence national
governance ideologically, institutionally, and socially. We show how the
overarching role of IIAs in national governance - to cultivate
constraining discipline in public administration - is realised and who
gets empowered and marginalised in the process. The book's findings will
serve in the debates about alternative ways of economic governance and
help explain the investment treaty regime's significant resistance to
change.